Regulation & Policy

Iran's Hormuz blacklist hits 130 shuttle tankers, not the barrels

Iran has blacklisted 130 of 231 Gulf shuttle tankers, but Vortexa data shows flows rising to 8.5m bpd as operators add STS transfers and lean on non-designated intermediaries.

Iran’s Hormuz blacklist reshapes flows, but exports hold
Exhibit · Iran’s Hormuz blacklist reshapes flows, but exports hold — jpeter2 / pixabay

Adjustments

  1. Iran's PGSA list of 2 November covers 130 of 231 Gulf shuttle tankers, 56% of the fleet.
  2. Shuttle volumes rose from 5.7m bpd in August to 8.5m bpd in October despite designations.
  3. Tankers designated 14 September–October cut weekly Hormuz transits 28%, from 21.7 to 15.6.
  4. Second STS transfers on designated tankers rose from 17% of barrels to 21% after listing.
  5. 89% of tankers with seven or more shuttle runs are blacklisted, against 26% of one-run vessels.

Iran has designated 130 of the 231 tankers running Gulf shuttle operations — 56% of the relay fleet — yet oil volumes through the shuttle system rose from 5.7m bpd in August to 8.5m bpd in October, Vortexa data shows. The restrictions are reshaping how cargoes move, not how much moves.

The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) expanded its Non-Compliance List on 2 November, adding 114 vessels and bringing the published total to 240. Designated shuttle tankers have accounted for roughly three-quarters of all runs between Gulf loading terminals and ship-to-ship (STS) transfer locations east of Hormuz. The listed fleet is dominated by large crude carriers: 86 VLCCs (very large crude carriers), alongside Suezmaxes, Aframaxes and product tankers.

Which ships did Iran target?

Activity, not origin. Of tankers that made a single shuttle run since March, only 26% appear on the list. Of those with four to six runs, 86% do; with seven or more runs, 89%. Listed tankers averaged 4.2 runs each against 1.7 for those left off.

Are exports actually falling?

Not yet. The 33 shuttle tankers designated by 14 September loaded an average of 2.1m bpd between 15 September and 25 October, up 42% from approximately 1.5m bpd in June–July. A comparison group of 20 tankers not designated until 2 November recorded 36% growth over the same window — broadly consistent.

Hormuz transits tell a different story:

  • Tankers designated between 24 August and 2 September averaged 10.3 weekly transits after listing, versus 10.8 before, while the wider oil-tanker fleet's transits rose 32%.
  • Vessels designated between 14 September and October saw weekly transits fall 28%, from 21.7 to 15.6, against a 31% rise across the wider fleet.
  • Shuttle runs to STS locations east of Hormuz declined by 22% and 29% for the two groups respectively.

Designated tankers are making fewer Hormuz voyages relative to overall market activity even as they keep loading. Vortexa cautions the divergence does not by itself establish that designations caused the slowdown.

Why are second STS transfers spreading?

On tankers designated by 14 September, the share of relayed barrels passing through a second STS transfer rose from 17% in June–July to 21% between 15 September and 25 October — about one in five barrels, up from one in six. On vessels not yet designated, the rate fell from 23% to 10%.

Vortexa tracked one designated VLCC that loaded crude at a Gulf terminal in early September and transferred its cargo to a non-designated tanker off Fujairah. The receiving tanker then split the cargo between two further vessels, which delivered to China and Singapore. One non-designated tanker that handled no cargoes from the early-designated fleet in June–July moved portions of 10 cargoes between mid-September and late October.

What happens next?

Three developments will test whether the relay can keep absorbing the restrictions:

  • The 2 November designations. The addition of 73 shuttle tankers more than doubled the designated shuttle fleet; their movements will show whether extra transfers become standard practice.
  • Intermediate vessel capacity. Greater reliance on a shrinking pool of non-designated tankers could raise vessel requirements and create bottlenecks.
  • Shuttle utilization. A sustained shift toward direct voyages, or longer turnarounds for shuttle vessels, could change the capacity and structure of the Gulf relay.

The PGSA blacklist has not yet produced a corresponding cut in Gulf shuttle volumes. The open question is how much additional complexity the relay can absorb before it dents the volume or speed of Gulf oil exports.

via Hellenic Shipping News (Source)

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Rebecca Stone

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News editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in commercial shipping for industry professionals at Vessels.

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  4. Clean-product tanker rates slide as Hormuz transits fall to 14 ships
  5. US LNG Tankers Turn Away From Egypt as Europe Pulls Cargoes

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